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CORPORATE EXECUTIVE DEFERRED COMPENSATION:
SHOULD THE EXERCISE OF STOCK APPRECIATION
RIGHTS (SARs) TRIGGER SECURITIES LAW LIABILITY?
JACK E. KARNS* AND JERRY G. HUNT**
I. INTRODUCTION
As the marketplace for the sale of goods and services becomes more
competitive, so too does the effort companies expend to attract and keep
highly-skilled corporate executives. Since Internal Revenue Code section
162(m) places limitations on the annual amount of executive compensa-
tion corporations may deduct from their taxes,' and because securities
laws make it difficult to profit from material inside information, firms
are looking to new financial products to compensate their executives.
Some of the more intriguing attempts are phantom stock concepts. Such
products generally create book values that accumulate personal value for
the executive in proportion to the firm's common stock- pricing but are
never converted into actual equity in the firm. One of the most popular
forms of this strategy is the stock appreciation right, or SAR.
A SAR is a form of deferred compensation in which a firm grants a
corporate executive a right to a proportionate benefit that occurs as a
consequence of an increase in the price of the firm's common stock
above a base or benchmark price, also known as the exercise price. The
* Professor of Business Law, East Carolina University, Greenville, NC.; LL.M. (Taxation),
1992, Georgetown University; J.D., 1981, Tulane University; M.P.A., M.S., 1974, B.A., 1973, Syracuse
University.
** Professor of Finance, East Carolina University, Greenville, NC.; Ph.D., 1968, University of
Colorado; B.A., 1964, University of Colorado.
1. Specifically, section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code prohibits a publicly-held corpora-
tion from deducting compensation as an expense item that exceeds one million dollars paid to the chief
executive officer (CEO) or the four most highly-compensated officers, excluding the CEO. See
Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 162(m) (1994). The preceding limitation does not apply to
"qualified performance-based compensation." Id. In the Notice of Special Meeting of Shareholders
for the purpose of considering a merger between NationsBank and Bank of America, Hugh McColl,
CEO of NationsBank, stated:
Because stock options and SARs granted under the Stock Plan must have an exercise
price equal at least to the fair market value at the date of grant and because the Stock
Plan limits the number of shares that may be the subject of awards granted to any
employee during any calendar year, compensation from the exercise of stock options
and SARs should be treated as 'qualified performance-based compensation' for Code
Section 162(m) purposes.
NATiONSBANK N OTICE OF SPECIAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS 81-82 (1998) [hereinafter NATIONSBANK
NOTICE]. Apparently, Mr. McColl was not prepared to say explicitly that the SARs would qualify as
"qualified performance-based compensation." The NationsBank Notice also did not address whether
the options and SARs conveyed under the plan were securities. Id. This did not appear to matter,
given the performance-based wording of section 162(m). See id.
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company sets the exercise price when it awards the SAR. The executive
gains if the stock price exceeds the exercise price, and when the right is
exercised, or "cashed in," the gain is paid in either cash or stock,
depending upon the terms of the compensation agreement. In the case
of a cash redemption, the value is tied directly to the stock value increase
from the date of issuance to the date of exercise.
While originally designed for privately-owned firms, SARs became
quite popular during the 1980s, when the largest public firms often used
them. Their popularity declined somewhat as a result of changes in tax
and securities laws, yet the desire to make aggressive use of the bull
market through stock price appreciation has led to a current revival of
interest in SARs. As they become more common, however, there are still
several unclear issues concerning their use. One such issue is whether an
executive could exercise SARs while knowing material, non-public
information which would be sufficient to trigger sanctions by the securi-
ties statutes. The most obvious question concerns the application of
insider trading laws, and whether the exercise of SARs constitutes a
violation thereof.
This is an important and current issue, as demonstrated by Clay v.
Riverwood International Corp.2 a recent Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals decision. Two firms were considering a corporate merger 3 that
included a large number of SARs and PSARs (premium stock
appreciation rights) for executives of the newly-merged firm. 4 The
2. 176 F.3d 1381 (1 1th Cir. 1999). The facts of the case appear most completely in the district
court opinion, Clay v. Riverwood International Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1559 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
3. 964 F. Supp at 1561. Riverwood International Corporation is a world-wide packaging and
packaging-machinery company. When this suit began, the Manville Corporation held a majority of
Riverwood's common stock. Id. In April 1995, because of Manville's liability in unrelated asbestos
litigation, the boards of directors of both firms established a Joint Special Committee (JSC) to evaluate
any and all options for enhancing Riverwood's value, including acquisition. Id. On June 28, a number
of forest products companies, after hearing verbal presentations by members of the Riverwood
management team, expressed interest in acquiring Riverwood. Id. at 1562. By mid-August 1995, the
plan was that a consortium of companies, led by a company called CD&R, would acquire Riverwood
through a merger transaction involving both cash and equity interest in the surviving corporation. Id.
During the time Riverwood and Manville were reviewing their alternatives, the financial press
published numerous articles that speculated on exactly what was happening within the inner sanctum
of both companies with regard to Riverwood's future. Id. at 1563-64. On October 25, 1995, the
boards of directors of both Riverwood and Manville concluded that the proposed offer was "fair to
and in the best interest of the stockholders," so they approved the proposal and recommended that the
stockholders do so as well. Id. at 1563. On October 26, 1995, Riverwood publicly announced an
agreement by which the acquiring firm would purchase the company for $20.25 per share, in cash,
subject to various financing conditions and approval by the shareholders of both Riverwood and
Manville. Id. The shareholders approved this proposed transaction, and the company redeemed
outstanding stock shares at the acquisition price. Id.
4. Id. at 1563-64. Riverwood, in March 1993, issued its executives a certain number of SARs that
entitled them to a payment from the corporation which equalled "the difference between the grant
value of the SAR and the fair market value of Riverwood stock on the date the executive exercised
the SAR." Id. at 1564. The SAR was payable in either cash or stock, at the company's discretion, and
the agreement granting the SARs stated explicitly that these rights were "not granted in tandem with
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plaintiff, Forrest Clay, purchased a significant number of stock shares
prior to the official announcement of the merger. 5 He eventually
suffered an acute loss when forced to accept a buyout price for his
shares significantly below his purchase cost, while company executives
exercised their SARs and PSARs with extremely propitious timing and
reaped a large benefit. 6
Clay brought a class action suit alleging both insider trading
violations and securities fraud, claiming that Riverwood did not
adequately inform the public of the merger and that he was injured,
while the executives gained, as result. 7 The district court ruled that Clay
lacked standing under section 20A of the Securities Act on the ground
that SARs were not "privileges with respect to securities" within the
meaning of section 20(d) of the Securities Act, which allows
insider-trading suits based on the alleged insider trading of securities of
the same class as those the plaintiff possessed. 8 Clay had argued that
SARs were such privileges, 9 but the court rejected his argument, noting
any Option, [did] not relate to any Option or other awards granted under the [1992 Long Term
Incentive Plan])." Id. The SAR grant provided that the executive would not have stockholder rights
with respect to the SARs and that they were not offers to sell securities. Id. Riverwood in 1994 also
granted thirty executives premium stock appreciation rights (PSARs), each allowing the recipient "a
payment from Riverwood equal to the difference between the grant value of the PSAR and the fair
market value of Riverwood stock on the date the executive exercised the PSAR." Id. Like the SARs,
the PSAR agreement expressly announced that they did not give the recipient any stockholder rights
and that they did not represent company securities. Id. On September 21, 1995, a number of
Riverwood executives, all individual defendants in this litigation, exercised both SARs and PSARs,
receiving payments in cash. Id. The individual executives did not exercise all of the SARs or PSARs
they had in their possession, but they all had a positive cash value. Id.
5. Id. at 1563. Throughout September 1995 Clay purchased 36,400 shares of Riverwood common
stock at prices ranging between $23 to $26 per share. Id. Ironically, Clay purchased his Riverwood
common stock on September 21, 1995, the exact date of which many of the corporate executives had
exercised their previously mentioned SARs and PSARs. Id. at 1568.
6. Id. The leveraged buyout price of the stock was $20.25 per share, meaning Clay lost between
$2.75 and $45.75 on each share, for a total loss between $100,100 and $209,300. Id.
7. Id. at 1564-65.
8. Id. at 1571-72. The court also rejected the fraud claim. Id. at 1572-75
9. The critical issue the court faced was whether or not the SARs and PSARs were covered by
the law of insider trading. Id. at 1568. As expected, Clay claimed they were, and the companies
argued they were not. Id. Clay's contention was that the executives were the recipients of inside
information and thus were liable through the exercise of the SARs and PSARs for any sanctions
provided by the securities statutes relative to fraud or insider trading. Id. His theory depended on an
interpretation of section 20A of the Securities Exchange Act which asserted that each SAR or PSAR
was, in fact, a "privilege with respect to" Riverwood stock, which would bring them within the
meaning of section 20(d). Id. This connection between Riverwood common stock and the SARs and
PSARs was crucial to Clay's case, because in order to constitute insider trading a transaction must
involve "securities of the same class" as those of the plaintiff. Id. This is because "traders of
different classes do not suffer because of the insider's superior access to information." Id.
In essence, Clay's position was that the SARs and PSARs were the equivalent of Riverwood
stock, and any exercise of those rights was tantamount to trading in company stock, requiring the same
standard to which any transaction that involved any type of corporate security would be subject. He
based this argument on the theory that SARs and PSARs were "privileges with respect to" the common
stock of the company, putting them within the stricture of the limited provisions of Section 20(d):
Wherever communicating, or purchasing or selling a security while in possession of,
material nonpublic information would violate, or result in liability to any purchaser or
1999]
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that the statute does not expressly list SARs as it does other securities,
most notably options, and that it was unwilling to read the statute broadly
enough to cover SARs.lO
Clay appealed, and on October 14, 1998, a panel of the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the district court's holding."l The
circuit initially went farther than the district court, however, and analyzed
why SARs generally should never violate insider-trading laws, not merely
holding that the securities in this case did not convey standing to Clay.12
seller of the security under any provision of this chapter, or any rule or regulation
thereunder, such conduct in connection with a purchase or sale of a put, call, straddle,
option, or privilege with respect to such security or with respect to a group or index of
securities including such security, shall also violate and result in comparable liability to
any purchaser or seller of that security under such provision, rule, or regulation.
Id. (citing Securities & Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(d)).
10. Id. at 1570-72. In disposing of Clay's arguments, the district court focused on whether there
was a "transactional nexus" between the exercise of the SARs and PSARs by the Riverwood
executives that would be sufficient to trigger insider trading liability. Id. The court relied heavily on
the fact that the recipients of the SARs did not have any rights as stockholders and that the SARs were
not offers to sell Riverwood securities. Id. The most important point, according to the court, was that
there was no market on which the SARs or PSARs could be traded in the same way that stock or
options could be traded. Id. at 1572. Therefore, the court held that SARs and PSARs could not be
"privileges with respect to securities" as that phrase was used in section 20(d). Id. The court
reasoned that even if the individual defendants had access to insider information, there was no
transactional nexus between the exercise of the rights contained in the SARs and PSARs and Clay's
stock purchases. Id.
According to the court, linking the value of the SARs and PSARs to the stock market price
constituted no more than a device commonly used by many in order to adjust or enhance an
executive's cash or non-cash compensation for his or her value to the company. Id. In terms of the
overall effect on the stock market, the value of the SARs and PSARs when exercised could have just
as easily been connected to the Dow Jones Index or another such index, but such a correlation would
not have provided the type of equity measurement that could be easily used in a compensation
environment. Id.
11. Clay v. Riverwood Int'l Corp., 157 F.3d 1259, 1266 (11 th Cir. 1998) ("Riverwood IF').
12. Id. at 1263-68. In his opinion for the circuit, Chief Judge Hatchett stated that the case
presented a question of first impression for the federal courts: "Whether corporate insiders' exercise
of stock appreciation rights for cash from their employing company implicates the insider trading laws
[of the securities statutes]." Id. at 1261. Notably, this was later vacated by another panel of the
circuit, which saw the issue much more narrowly. Clay v. Riverwood Int'l Corp., 176 F.3d 1381,
1381-82 (11 th Cir. 1999) ("Riverwood I11'). Nevertheless, the original analysis is worth reviewing, as
it provides an expression of the argument against treating SAR's and options similarly, discussed infra
Part III.
Hatchett began by considering Clay's allegation that the Riverwood officers had violated the
"disclose or abstain" rule regarding insider trading. Riverwood 1I, 157 F.3d at 1264. This allegation
was based on long-standing securities law that, in this case, would hold that the corporate executives
had violated securities laws by exercising their SARs and PSARs with the knowledge that there was a
major corporate transaction in the offing that "would cause the value of a share to drop substantially
less than current market value." Id. According to Hatchett, Clay's principal problem was analogizing
SARs and PSARs to "options." Id. at 1266. The only authority Clay could cite for this proposition was
a Seventh Circuit observation that SARs had attributes like options, although they were in fact not
options. Hatchett disagreed with Clay on this point:
[A]II stock options when exercised involve a market transaction-even if it takes a
split-second for holders to sell on the market the stock that they received in order to
capture the difference between the grant and market values. Holders of SARs, like the
ones in this case, in material contrast, receive cash directly out of the issuer-company's
treasury. They do not sell stock at any time.
Id.
The opinion also considered whether SARs and PSARs were "privileges with respect to"
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One year later, the Eleventh Circuit reconsidered the case, and on
May 17, 1999, it issued an opinion vacating its original decision. 13 For
all practical purposes, this new opinion reinstated the district court's deci-
sion while retaining some parts of the original circuit opinion.' 4 As a
result, Riverwood executives made a large profit, while Clay suffered a
staggering loss.
This article discusses the issue of treating SARs as securities. Part II
provides a detailed discussion of various options, including calls, puts
and straddles, derivative securities that do trigger insider-trading laws.
Part III argues, based on corporate financial literature, that SARs should
be treated like other derivative securities. This section considers and
rejects the distinctions between securities and SARs, distinctions that can
be seen in the Riverwood decisions.15
II. OPTIONS: CALLS, PUTS AND STRADDLES
The following discussion provides background on options, both
generally and of several specific kinds. This will equip the reader with
the knowledge and vocabulary required for the next section, which
argues that options and SARs are fundamentally economically similar
and, as such, must be treated similarly for purposes of insider-trading
laws.16
A. BACKGROUND
Generally, an option is a contract to buy or sell an underlying asset
at a specified price anytime before a specified date. They are commonly
divided into "calls" and "puts"; calls permit the purchase of an asset,
securities. Hatchett dismissed this argument quickly, noting that the "exercise of the SARs ... did not
affect the legal or beneficial ownership of any stock or the right to own, purchase, or sell any stock."
Id. He also distinguished traditional options, which are actually traded on established securities
markets, from the SARs in this case, whose transfer to any other individual was expressly prohibited
by the granting agreement. Id. Accordingly, the 11 th Circuit originally affirmed the lower court's
summary judgment, although it did so on broader grounds that reached the substantive question of the
connection between SARs and other derivative securities. Id. This opinion affirmed the district
court's analysis of the fraud claim, although with greater analysis.
13. Riverwood ili, 176 F.3d 1381.
14. Id. at 1381-82. The new opinion vacated the original introduction and discussion of insider
trading, substituting in its place a concurrence from the original opinion. Id. The new opinion,
however, left unchanged the analysis of the fraud claim. Id.
15. As mentioned, Clay also alleged that the press releases Riverwood released regarding its
future were fraudulent. Riverwood, 964 F. Supp at 1572-75. The district court rejected this claim. Id.
The original circuit court opinion agreed with this holding, but it provided much greater detail as to
why they were not a violation of disclosure rules. Riverwood 1, 157 F.3d at 1268-69. The final circuit
opinion did not affect this analysis. Riverwood 11, 176 F.3d at 1381-82. The issues raised by these
opinions are beyond the scope of this article, which focuses on the insider-trading implications of the
decisions. However, the opinions could have effects on the law of corporate disclosure, as they seem
to go further than the established law in that area.
16. See generally infra Part 1ll.
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while puts permit the sale of an asset. 17 Like SARs, all options have an
exercise price and a maturity date.
As mentioned, options can be calls or puts, and both may be bought
and sold. Hence, an option contract may be any of four possible types.
While pure options exist, it is more common to find various types of
options embedded or implied in business contracts. 18 Options can be
traded on options exchanges or over the counter (OTC). Exchange-
traded options have the advantage of greater liquidity, convenience and
less credit risk than OTC-traded or non-traded options. However, OTC
and non-traded options have the advantage of flexibility and complete-
ness. Options contracts available on exchanges are limited in number,
while other options contracts are practically infinite in their numbers and
conditions.
Among the non-traded options contracts are executive stock options
and SARs. The variations of these contracts are quite numerous, al-
though the basic types are qualifying and non-qualifying. In general,
when used as part of compensation arrangements, executive options
permit an individual executive to purchase company stock at a favorable
exercise price until a specified maturity date.19
One of the key issues in a discussion of options is valuation. For all
options, the underlying asset provides the largest component of value,
which is why the securities are referred to as "derivative" of the under-
17. For a detailed discussion of these types of options, see infra Part lI.B.
18. For example, convertible bonds consist of a straight bond plus a bundle of call options on the
common stock. See PETER R rrCHKEN, OPnoNs: THEORY, S TRATEGY AND A PPLICATIONS 348-54 (Scott,
Foresman & Company eds., 1987) (providing a conceptual overview of this process). Convertible
bonds are valued by discounting at the discount rate appropriate for the issuing firm's straight bonds,
while the coupon payments are necessarily below the market rates on straight bonds. See id. This
combination of factors provides a bond value of a convertible that will be less than par value, typically
$1,000. See id. The bond will nevertheless be sold for approximately $1,000, because buyers of
convertibles recognize that they receive the right to convert them into shares of the issuing firm's
common stock. See id. The exercise price is the par value divided by the number of shares per bond,
and the maturity is frequently quite long, as much as 15 years, although a shorter period is generally
preferred. See id. Hence, the exercise price on the options for a convertible giving 40 shares per
bond would be $25, and should the common stock rise above $25 per share, the conversion value of
the bond rises above $1,000. See id. If the original purchase of the convertible included a bond value
of $800 plus 40 options for a total price of $1,000, the premium on the options would have been $200
divided by 40, or $5 per option. See id. Initially, the options would be worthless, but when the stock
price exceeded $25 per share, the options would have values commensurately higher. See id.
19. The firm typically grants the executive the right to purchase shares at a favorable price for a
few years. For example, the terms might permit purchase of up to 50,000 share as $60 per share at
any time up to four years from the date of issuance. If the stock price rises to $75, the executive can
call in the stock at $75 per share for as many shares as desires. The entire package would cost $3
million to purchase at the exercise, and the gain to the executive would be the 50,000 shares times the
gain per option of $15, or a total of $750,000. Sometimes the problem arises that the executive does
not have sufficient cash either to purchase the share or to pay tax on the gain, and he or she must face
ultimate issues of liquidation in order to take full advantage of the call. See C.W. Smith, Jr. & J.L.
Zimmerman, Valuing Employee Stock Option Plans Using Option Pricing Models, 14 J. ACCT. RES.,
Autumn 1976, at 357-64.
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lying asset. However, one can identify several other factors that deter-
mine value in options, discussed in detail infra Part II.B. However, it is
critical to note that while all of the sources of value can fluctuate, the
term to maturity can only decrease. Hence, one characteristic of options
that differs from other securities, such as common stock, is the time
delay in value. 20
"Intrinsic value," "at-the-money," "out-of-the-money" and
"premium" are also important option contracts terms. The intrinsic
value is the difference between the asset price and exercise price. For
example, if the exercise price of a common stock issue is $40 and the
market price is $50, the intrinsic value is $10. If this condition exists
when the stock price is higher than the exercise price, the call is said to
be in-the-money. If the stock price were $40 and the exercise price $50,
the option would be out-of-the-money, since the stock price is below the
exercise price. If the stock price and exercise price are both $40, then
the option is at-the-money. The premium is the amount paid for the
option; using the above numbers, the intrinsic value of $10 would also be
the premium. One reason for having another term is that options usually
sell at a price above their intrinsic value because of the volatility com-
ponent mentioned above. If the stock price was $50, the exercise price
$40, and the market price of the option $12, the premium would be $12,
while the intrinsic value would remain.
The above discussion is a brief sketch of general options principles.
The following sections explore specific options in more detail.
B. BASIC OPTIONS: CALLS AND PUTS
The two basic types of option contracts in the marketplace today are
calls and puts. The call option gives the holder the right, but not the
obligation, to purchase an asset at a specified price for a specified time
period, while the put gives the holder the right, but not the obligation, to
sell an asset at a specified price for a specified time period. The price is
known as the exercise price or the strike price, and the time period is
denoted as the expiration date or maturity date. In general, these two
features must exist in order to create a valid option contract.
Furthermore, the buyer generally must also pay a premium price to
obtain the right to exercise the contract if desired.
20. See FRANK J. FABozzI, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 380 (2d ed. 1999). Thus, a three-month call
option might have a value of $10, while a one-month call option with the same exercise price and
volatility measure would have a lower price, such as $4. See id. At maturity, the value of the call
option goes to zero; generally, no exceptions to this rule are permitted, because the option becomes
void the day after maturity. See id.
1999]
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Both call and put contracts can be either purchased or sold, but they
are typically viewed from the buyer's perspective. The buyer of an
option is said to be in a long position;2 1 if the contract is not exercised
by the maturity date, it expires unexercised. The fact that the buyer of a
call has no legal obligation to purchase, and the buyer of a put has no
obligation to sell, the asset if it appears to have no value above the
exercise price means that the buyer cannot be forced to exercise a
worthless contract and incur additional loss. The buyer of an option can
walk away from the contract and permit its expiration. The original
premium price, therefore, represents the maximum loss for the buyer.
The seller of an option contract, also known as the writer, 22 gives the
buyer the right to purchase or sell the asset at a specified exercise price
prior to the maturity or expiration date. The writer is said to be a short
position. 23 If the writer is notified that the buyer wishes to exercise, the
writer must deliver the asset to, or purchase the asset from, the buyer for
the exercise price. If the asset is worth too little to trigger the buyer's
call, or worth too much to trigger a put, the writer retains all of the
premium purchase price, but receives no further payments. After the
maturity date, the contract expires and has no further value to either
party or anyone else.24 Thus, the security interest in an option exists
until either expiration or cancellation.
The sources of value in options contracts are based on the underly-
ing asset. 25 More fundamentally, there are several reasons for options to
have significant economic value. These formulations are essentially
opposite for calls and puts. For example, a call's value increases with the
value of the underlying asset, while a put's value increases as the value of
the underlying asset decreases. The following formulas are for calls; in
each case, the opposite is true for a put.
21. Buyers or options are said to be "long position," while sellers of options are said to be in a
"short" position. ROBERT A. JARROW & ANDREW RUDD, OPrION PRICING 5 (Richard D. Irwin ed., 1983).
22. Id. at 5. Thus, a seller writes the contract and places him or herself in a short position. For
example, a writer sells a call giving the buyer the right to buy an asset at $40 at any time during the
next three months. See GARY L. GASTINEAU, THE OPTIONS MANUAL 42-43 (3d ed. 1988).
23. The short position of the seller implies that if the buyer exercises the call, the seller would
need to come up with the asset, if he or she was not already in possession of same. Furthermore, the
seller can hold a more conservative position by currently owning the asset, but if a call contract is sold
without owning the asset, the sell is said to be "naked," and naked positions are more risky than
covered positions. See GASTINEAU, supra note 22, at 42-43.
24. Unexercised options expire as worthless contracts when the time to maturity reaches zero,
regardless of values of other variables. See FABOZZi, supra note 20, at 380.
25. See JOHN C. HULL, INTRODUCION TO FUTURES AND OFnONS MARKETS 12 (3d ed. 1998).
"Derivatives" as a term has come into general usage only since the mid 1980s. Id. The term refers to
many contracts such as options (puts, calls, warrants), futures contracts and swaps and implies that all
value must be based on another underlying asset or security. Id.
[VOL. 75:535
CORPORATE EXECUTIVE DEFERRED COMPENSATION
The first formula is the example above: A call's value increases
with the value of the underlying asset (while a put's decreases). Second,
the smaller the value of the exercise price, given the same asset price, the
greater the value of the call. Third, the greater the value of risk-free mar-
ket interest rates, which provides an alternative opportunity for invest-
ment, the greater the value of the call. Fourth, the longer the maturity
date or expiration date from the present, the greater the value of the call.
This source of value derives from the fact that the greater the time
allowed for the underlying asset to appreciate in value, the greater the
value of the call associated with the asset. Fifth, the greater the volatility
of the asset value, with the asset price remaining the same, the greater the
call's value.26
Options based on common stock may be traded OTC or on an
organized exchange. Prior to 1972, all option trading was between
interested parties without an intermediary. 27 Since then, organized ex-
changes have existed for limited numbers of common stock issues.
However, for many options based on common stock issues, and for most
other assets, trading exists only between the two interested parties,
although agents such as attorneys and brokers may be involved in the
transactions. Hence, there exist very liquid options exchange markets
for a limited number of common stock issues; all other option trading is
considered OTC.28
Some options are not traded at all; foremost among these are
executive stock options and SARs. These tend to be part of executive
26. Id. at 170. This source of value derives from the fact that greater volatility means a greater
probability that the underlying asset will increase in value above the exercise price prior to its
expiration, while if the value of the asset decreases or remains below the exercise price, the holder or
buyer simply permits the option to expire without exercising the right, because to do otherwise would
create an additional, unnecessary loss.
As noted previously, the fact that options convey a "right without an obligation" implies that for a
call option, the buyer cannot be forced to buy an asset that is not in his or her own interest. For
example, with an exercise price of $50, the call has no value if the market price is $40, and so the long
call holder would have no economic interest in paying $50 for an asset whose market price makes it
available at $40.
27. Id. at 5. Calls options were actually the first to trade on the Chicago Board Options Exchange
(CBOE), and puts followed somewhat later. Other exchanges followed with options contracts on other
securities, and for several years there was no overlap in trading among the various exchanges. That
is, if IBM options were traded on the CBOE, they were not concurrently traded on the American,
Pacific or Philadelphia Exchanges. That practice has changed, such that multiple or overlap trading
presently occurs in some securities. Id.
28. Only a small number of securities, approximately 50 to 200, ever have listed options on
exchanges. However, the number of options contracts is a few thousand in total because each
possible maturity and strike price, on both calls and puts, are separate contracts. Hence, if a firm has
three maturities trading, with ten strike prices, with both calls and puts on each combination, there
would be a total of 60 contracts (3 maturities x 10 strike prices x 2 option types). These numbers are
tiny when compared with the thousands of common and preferred stock securities available for
trading on any given business day, which typically run in a range with a minimum of five to ten
thousand. See JARow & RUDD, supra note 21, at 3-4.
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deferred compensation contract packages, based on a valid personal-
services contract. Hence, no current market exists for trading in such
options. However, the sources of value remain the same as other traded
options. This is the underlying asset, which in most cases would be the
common stock of the firm. Frequently, the need to estimate the value of
such contracts arises, and if traded options exist for the firm, the same
methods are employed to find a first approximation to the value of the
executive stock options. If no traded options exist, then similar funda-
mental methods must be employed to estimate a fair value for the call
options. It is clear that the terms "call" and "put" have the same impli-
cation as previously defined: The owner of the option has the right to
purchase or sell an underlying asset, typically common stock, at a speci-
fied exercise price until the maturity date. Thus, the fact that some
options are not traded would not necessarily imply a significant differ-
ence in magnitude of the current value. 29
The creation and cancellation of option contracts are generally
quite simple. Generally, creation requires the agreement of mutually
interested parties willing to create a contract, and cancellation occurs with
its exercise by the holder. If the option is traded, then two separate
transactions are necessary: The purchaser buys the option from an ex-
change, while the exchange effectively buys the option from its seller, or
writer. If the option is not traded, agreement of both parties is required
to void or cancel the contract. If the contract is traded, cancellation or
destruction of the contract is much simpler, since the buyer can cancel
his or her position by selling an option contract with identical terms to
the one that was purchased initially. Notification to brokers and
exchanges is required to guarantee that the contractual arrangement is
terminated to the satisfaction of the party wishing to cancel. Hence,
creation and destruction of option contracts is straightforward. The
notion regarding canceling is that the buyer has already paid the premi-
um for the option, and canceling is equivalent to the cancellation of a
service contract prior to its expiration. The buyer may be entitled to a
29. See Eric Noreen & Mark Wolfson, Equilibrium Warrant Pricing Models and Accounting for
Executive Stock Options, 19 J. AccT. RES., Autumn 1981, at 385-86. The results here show that Black-
Scholes Option Pricing methods could be used for executive stock options based on their similarity to
warrants. The executive stock options are non-traded until exercised. See Smith & Zimmerman,
supra note 19, at 357-64. The basis for noting that the security interest is significant is that the con-
ceptual value of a put option can be employed to determine the "fair value." While traded, put options
have market prices to confirm the "fair value," the determination of the fair value proceeds accom-
plished in a manner similar for non-traded options. Market values of traded options correlate quite
closely with conceptual or fail value calculations. For a more complete explanation of put valuation,
see Karen L. Farkas & Robert L. Hoskin, Testing a Valuation Model for American Put. FiN. M M'T.,
Autumn 1979, at 51-56.
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partial refund of the unused premium, minus any costs or penalties
associated with the cancellation.
C. STRADDLES AND OTHER COMBINATION OPTIONS
A straddle option is defined as a combination of a put and a call.3 °
Other simple strategies with similar, but not identical, combinations are
strips,31 straps 32 and strangles. 33 Straddles, however, represent the proto-
typical combination strategy. The creation of a straddle includes the pur-
chase of a call and a put on the same underlying security. The exercise
price and expiration date will be the same for both. A straddle strategy
would be appropriate if an investor expected a significant move in the
underlying asset, such as common stock, but the direction of the move
was uncertain over the time period,
The buyer of a straddle is in a long position as to both a call and a
put. If the underlying security moves significantly up or down, the
investor gains from the long straddle. If the security fails to move
outside a predetermined range, the investor has no gain in the straddle
and may lose up to the entire premium paid. For example, assume a
stock issue trading at $59 per share. A two-month call with an exercise
price of $60 per share costs $4 and a put with similar characteristics costs
$3 a share. An investor expecting a large move would purchase a
straddle.
If the price moves to $75 a share, there is a recognized $8 gain,
since the $67 cost is equal to the total of the exercise price plus the costs
of both the put and call. In reality, the put is worthless, while the call is
worth at least $15. If the price drops to $45 per share, a gain of $8 is
recognized, as the exercise price is diminished by the cost of the put and
call. Again, in reality, the call becomes worthless and the put is worth at
least $15 per share. However, if the stock price remains within $7 of the
30. A long straddle is the purchase of a call option and a put option with the same maturity and
strike price. For example, a call contract and a put contract, each with an exercise price of $60, and
each maturing in two months, would a long straddle. The buyer pays for each option, and the seller
received the prices of the premium on the two options. See JACK CLARK FRANCIS, INVESTMENTS:
ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT 715-17 (5th ed. 1991).
31. A strip is a position in one call and two puts with the same strike price and expiration date.
Thus, the buyer pays the premium for three options. See Zvi BODIE ET AL., INVESTMENTS 572-73
(1989).
32. Id. A strap is a position in two calls and one put with each having the same strike price and
expiration date. Thus, the buyer of a strap pays for three options. Id.
33. A strangle is a position with a put and call on the same security with the same expiration date,
but with different strike prices. The long straddle would require that the put have a lower than the call
strike price. A long strangle is similar to a straddle, but the maximum loss is minimized. Accordingly,
professional traders favor strangles. See ROBERT A. STRONG, SPECULATIVE MARKETS: OPIONS,
FUTREs AND HARD ASSETS 54-56 (Longman Fin. Servs. Publ'g eds., 1989).
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$60 exercise price, only losses occur, depending on the exact price at the
time the contract is closed.
If an investor expects a small movement, or no movement, in a
stock, then selling a straddle would produce a gain. The writer sells a
call and put on the same asset with the same exercise price and maturity
date. The maximum gain to a straddle writer is the premium received
from the buyer of the straddle. In the example above, the seller would
receive the $7 per straddle and keep a maximum of $7 if the price failed
to move. Small moves would reduce the premium the seller receives.
Only after a greater than $7 move would a seller lose, but he or she is
exposed to a potentially unlimited loss once the price changes beyond
the established range, here $7.
The sources of value in straddles are based on the same factors that
support the basic call and put valuations. However, a straddle represents
a strategy that attempts to profit from changing volatility, in which an
increasing volatility would imply that buying would be appropriate. A
belief in decreasing volatility would imply that selling a straddle would
be more profitable. While the gains and losses appear to be symmetrical
for buyers and sellers, the risk is substantially greater for the seller than
the buyer. The buyer has no liability beyond the initial premium paid,
and the maximum loss is known in advance. The seller has unlimited
liability, and although this theoretical level is not expected in practice,
the size of the loss is more difficult to predict in advance when planning
the strategy.34
Straddles may be traded using exchange-traded calls and puts or
they may be employed by an investor who has a contract with another
interested party. Therefore, while straddles seem to require exchange
trading, there is in fact no difference in value between traded and OTC
straddles. However, there are questions relating to liquidity of OTC calls
and puts (and straddles) that are not identical for exchange-traded calls
and puts.
34. With written straddles, the writer prefers that the stock price move very little, because he or
she then keeps the premium and the straddle expires almost worthless. However, if the price moves
outside the break-even levels on the upside or downside, then losses occur because the long straddle
might be exercised. The break-even levels are determined by adding to, and subtracting from, the
exercise price the premiums for the two options. The loss cannot be predicted because it is not evident
in advance how quickly the straddle writer could extricate himself from the contract in the case where
prices move enough to create losses. For example, assume that the exercise price was $50, the call
premium was $6 and the put premium was $4; the seller would receive a total premium of $10 per
straddle. Of course, all options trade in round lots analogous to stock trades, so the total dollars
involved would be $600 for the calls and $400 for the puts, or $1,000 for the straddle contract. The
loss boundaries would be $40 and $60, and price moves beyond these figures would lead to increasing
losses for the writer. HULL, supra note 25, at 227-28.
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The creation of a straddle consists of setting up a combination
strategy either buying or selling calls and puts with the same exercise
price and maturity date. The strategy must be identified as a straddle to
the broker or agent responsible for assisting in the trading. When one
wishes to cancel an exchange-traded straddle, one merely notifies the
broker-agent that an offsetting trade is to be ordered. If a purchase of a
straddle is followed by an expected large stock move, the strategy could
be canceled by selling a straddle and eliminating the position. The gain
or loss would depend on the price change that had occurred in both the
underlying stock and the two derivatives. An attempt to cancel a
non-traded straddle cannot be guaranteed, since the mutual assent of
both parties would be required to cancel the contract.
Notably, all of the derivative securities discussed above are classified
as "privileges with respect to" common stock, bringing them within the
purview of insider trading laws. 35 The next section argues that SARs
have the same economic consequences as options, and as such should
also be subject to insider trading laws.
III. TREATING SARS AS SECURITIES
This section focuses on the relationship between traditional,
exchange-traded options and SARs and argues that SARs and other
forms of executive options should be regulated like traded options for
purposes of insider trading laws. Essentially, this section argues that
similar economic entities with similar payoffs and risks should be valued
as like-kind. From an accounting perspective, the costs of comparable
executive compensation components should be accounted for in a
similar manner. 36 Such a treatment is appropriate because the economic
and financial characteristics of SARs are quite similar to those of com-
pensatory stock options, as is the accounting treatment.37
35. Clay v. Riverwood Int'l Corp., 157 F.3d 1259, 1266 (1 th Cir. 1998) ("Riverwood I") (citing
Securities & Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(d) (1994)).
36. The accounting for SARs and executive options is covered in Accounting Principles Board
Opinion No. 25 and Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Interpretation No. 28.
37. The specific accounting for SARs is not identical to that for stock options. See generally
LOREN A. N IKOLAi & JOHN D. B AZLEY, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING (5th ed. 1991). Yet, many account-
ing scholars argue quite convincingly that they should be, and a significant difference of opinion exists
within the accounting profession. See generally Steven Balsam, Extending the Method of Accounting
for Stock Appreciation Rights to Employee Stock Options, 8 AcCT. HORIZONS, Dec. 1994, at 52.
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As Riverwood shows, SARs are an important part of executive com-
pensation. The underlying motivation for granting executive compen-
satory stock options has always been to "tie" or "closely relate" the
fortunes of the firm and the executives responsible for its success over a
reasonable time period. Loyalty to the firm and ability to induce or
motivate all employees to perform at the highest level throughout the
firm has often been seen as justification for inclusion of a stock-based
incentive as part of the total compensation contract, typically a package
of options and SARs. 38 Furthermore, use of such plans provides a partial
deferral of current income, which provides another reason contributing
to the popularity of such plans among both executives and corporate
boards.
SAR contracts are usually stated as following: If the common stock
price rises above a given benchmark stock price, then the executive will
be paid the difference between the market value at the time of exercise
and the given or exercise price. 39 The executive cannot then trade the
SARs; he or she is in fact tied to the firm at least until the values are
vested. This is how the Riverwood SARs and PSARs operated.4 0 The
accounting treatment of SARs sets out procedures for allocating the
costs, including those in excess of the exercise price, over the time in
which the contract is valid. As with executive stock options, the only way
in which the owner of a SAR gains or benefits is when the market price
of the common stock rises above the exercise price. The executive has an
incentive to exercise the option in part or in total as soon as the market
price exceeds the exercise price, or near the end of the option period,
whichever is more advantageous. 41 Thus, one could reasonably argue
38. Since the cash problems of executive options are well known, firms frequently create a
package of benefits as part of an entire compensation package. No similar problems exist with SARs:
They can be exercised in cash and taxes paid, and if stock options are also available in the package,
some of them may be exercised with the SAR cash. The entire combined value of the package of
SARs and options would be considered by the firm as the required benefit for the executive's services.
The cost to the firm is considered a necessary cost, regardless of the implications of Internal Revenue
Code section 162(m), even though a possible negative cash flow would ensue that could have some
stock market implications. The important issue in this instance is whether, once SAR cash is received
as the result of inside information and is used to exercise existing stock options, insider trading rules
have been violated. See Amanda Bennett, Firms May Eliminate Spin-Off of Stock Options, WALL
STREET J., Feb. 13, 1991,at BI.
39. The method of determining the gain, ignoring cash flow implications, would be the same for
the SARs as for the stock options. The cost accounting details would, however, differ slightly for the
two financial instruments. See generally NIKOLAI & BAZLEY, supra note 37.
40. See Clay v. Riverwood Int'l Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1559, 1564 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
41. A possible problem arises, however, when the exercise of the options requires a significant
amount of cash to pay for the exercise, since the entire exercise price must be paid by the recipient of
the options. Due to the large numbers of options that are usually involved, a significant amount of cash
must be raised by the executive to pay the taxes on the gain. A gain must exist when the market price
rises above the exercise price, thus creating a gain for the executive and will be taxable at either
long-term or short-term rates. Also, there are often cash flow problems associated with the exercise
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that SARs are securities because their values are determined in a manner
analogous to that by which the values of traditional stock options are
determined.
There are several key similarities that justify treating exchange-
traded options and SARs according to the same rules. First, both options
and SARs can be valued accurately according to models. Though
exchange-traded options are valued by market participants, their values
can be determined by financial models, which generally are able to
compute market value in excess of 99.5% accuracy, or within about five
cents on a $10 option. The Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB), an accounting rule-making body, has supported the use of these
models when computing the value of executive stock options such as
SARs.42 While this approach is not without controversy, it allows
determination of the value of non-traded executive stock options with
similar levels of accuracy as valuations for exchange traded options.
Even without the benefit of market price discovery as exists in
options markets, therefore, option values can be determined quite
accurately. This is possible because the non-traded options behave as
derivative securities identical to traded derivative securities. It is the
economic substance of executive stock options that permits accurate
valuation in the absence of current market trading. They are related to
the underlying security of the firm, as are exchange-traded options. 43 If
a contractual arrangement such as a SAR possesses the economic
characteristics of options, then the intrinsic value of the contract should
be determined in a manner similar to that used for options. 44 It should
of compensatory executive stock options.
42. The primary model used for option valuation has been the Black-Scholes Option Pricing
Model (OPM). While some controversy exists regarding the use of this model, along with its improved
variations, the fact remains that its accuracy is the greatest of all financial models used today.
Accuracy implies that the fair value found by the Black-Scholes OPM correlates with observed
market prices to a very high level of significance. It could be said that while a conceptual model
might be used to determine the value of non-traded options, the accuracy is probably greater than
99%. See Balsam, supra note 37, at 52-60 (providing a review of the accounting perspective); see
also James D. MacBeth & Larry J. Merville, An Empirical Examination of the Black-Scholes Call
Option Pricing Model 34 J. FIN., Dec. 1979, at 1173-86 (providing an evaluation of model accuracy).
43. Executive stock options can be valued using the Black-Scholes OPM, but often they could
also be compared to the listed options available on one of the listed exchanges, assuming that the
firm's securities are among those traded. See STEPHEN A. Ross ET. AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 578-82
(5th ed. 1999).
44. The SAR performs in an identical manner to an executive stock option, and contains
economic payoffs based on identical variables and results. That is, the firm grants the executive the
right to gain if the firm's common stock increases in value above a specified level. The specified
level is the exercise price and the firm will set a maturity date similar or identical to the common stock
options. As with options, if the market price of the common stock exceeds the exercise price, the
executive is eligible for a gain. The gain can be accepted in cash or stock, and in either case, the
taxes are paid by the recipient of the benefit. However, the special benefit of the SARs is that the
cash payment alternative means that the executive need not sell some of all or the stock in order to pay
for the exercise and the taxes. In all other ways, the economic behavior and predictability of the SAR
payoff parallels the executive stock option alternative. See id.
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also be noted that FASB No 28, which covers the accounting for "Stock
Appreciation Rights and Other Variable Stock Option or Award Plans,"
does not distinguish any economic difference between options and
SARs.45
Finally, a recent discussion paper by FASB comes to the conclusion
that a cash-settled long-call option indexed to its own stock could be
used as a cash flow hedge of the expected future cash flows attributable
to changes in the company's stock price that arises in non-vested SARs,
assuming that vesting is probable. Such a conclusion is identical with the
use of a call option or other option that might also be traded on ex-
changes or OTC. This is the case since the accounting rules provide for
similar treatment for contracts having comparable economic and finan-
cial implications.4 6
Despite the similarity of SARs and stock options, however, some
argue that they should be treated differently. 47 Such arguments accentu-
ate the differences between SARs and options and minimize or attenuate
the similarities. While there might exist several minor differences and
similarities, one should consider mainly the salient features of SARs com-
pared to executive stock options, focusing primarily on the economic
substance of the arguments.
First, consider the primary argument against the treatment of SARs
as securities, as seen in various forms in the different Riverwood
opinions. This argument is based on methods of valuation: While
options must be valued by subtracting the exercise price from the market
price at the time of exercise, option values during the pre-exercise period
can be valued conceptually by financial models, as discussed above.
Since there is always a true market connection with any valuation, this
argument presumably implies that a market relationship does not exist
45. Since the payoff characteristics of SARs match that of executive stock options, the
Black-Scholes OPM, as adjusted if necessary, could be employed to determine the "fair" value of the
SARs just as certainly as for other securities such as options and warrants. For a more complete
description of accounting principles for SARs and executive options, see NtKOLA & BAZLEY, supra
note 37, at 794-802.
46. SARs are treated similarly to options in accounting for variable executive compensation
contracts. In each instance, while the SARs and stock options may not be traded or exchanged, the
value continues to be determined by the market value of the underlying security, the firm's common
stock. Cash Flow Hedges: Hedging a SAR Obligation, FASB DERIVATIVES IMPLEMENTATION GROUP
STATEMENT 133, IMPLEMENTATION ISSUE, No. GI, Sept. 1998.
47. For an example of such an argument, see the majority opinion in Riverwood II, 157 F.3d
1259, 1264-68 (11 th Cir. 1998), discussed supra Part I and note 12.
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for SARs, since SARs cannot be traded, and that this difference justifies
differential treatment. 48
In contrast, consider the two primary arguments for treating SARs
as securities. The accounting treatment of SARs, as noted above, is
completely analogous to the treatment for compensatory executive stock
options. The FASB uses the economic substances of an activity as a
significant basis for its accounting treatment. This is so because finan-
cial statements are intended to present fairly the economic and financial
position of a firm at a point in time.49 Furthermore, the economic and
financial substance of SAR contracts mirrors that of the executive stock
options with which they are often matched.
There are several such similarities between SARs and executive
stock options. First, they provide similar incentives; by increasing per
share values for all stockholders, the executives increase the value of
both stock options and SARs. Further, both forms of compensation have
value only when the market price of the common stock exceeds the
exercise price. Finally, both require the executive to remain with the
firm in order to benefit from the contract incentives, and both are forms
of deferred compensation. Hence, one could argue that there is no
essential economic difference between stock options and SARs. If stock
options are securities, then SARs are securities, since the economic
substance of a security is a claim against some asset, usually stated in
financial or monetary terms.
Further, the claim that SARs differ from options because they
cannot be traded is misleading. All securities may have disclaimers and
48. To grasp this point better, it is necessary to refer to one of the models used to value options,
such as Black-Scholes. The model includes variables including, but not limited to the exercise price,
time to maturity, the risk-free rate of return, the common stock price and market volatility. Those
exact variables would also be used to determine the fair value of a SAR at any point in time up to the
time of exercising, a value that will always be more than or equal to the intrinsic value. Balsam, supra
note 37, at 53; see also JOHN C. COX & MARK RUBENSTEIN, OpTIoNs MARKERS 33-38 (1985).
49. See NIKOLAI & BAZLEY, supra note 37, at 9-23. The authors provide a detailed summary of
"Objectives of Financial Reporting by Business Enterprises." NIKOLAI & BAZLEY, supra note 37, at
9-23. The Financial Standards Accounting Board (FASB) is an organization created by private,
academic and public entities with an interest in standard accounting procedures. The FASB is strongly
influenced by the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC), the American Institute of Certified
Accountants (AICPA) and the American Accounting Association (AAA). The pressure from both
academia and the SEC is to move accounting decisions closer and closer to full disclosure of true
economic conditions. While such an objective may be difficult to define and achieve, the changes in
financial statements during the last two decades has been toward correctly identifying real value, as
opposed to market value. Financial analysts continually look behind the accounting methods to find the
best economic and financial substance of a given action. Thus, a firm granting a package of SARs
and executive options would be analyzed to include the possible impact on the finn's market price
arising as a consequence of the firm's use of these financial products.
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restrictions, as is seen in letter stock or restricted stock.5 0 For example,
some securities may not be traded for various periods of time. This fact
undercuts the argument that SARs' inherent trading restrictions dis-
tinguish them from options. Therefore, the most reasonable interpreta-
tion of a SAR is that it is a security in the same sense as an executive
stock option. Each has similar accounting and economic characteristics.
However, there is one sense in which SARs might have a superior
position as a security as compared to an executive stock option. Stock
options must be purchased with cash, thereby triggering a taxable
event. 5 1 Normally, some shares of stock must be sold to satisfy the
liquidity need associated with the stock option exercise.
SARs, contrarily, may be paid in either stock or cash, which clearly
contributes to their popularity. The cash payment provides the means to
pay the tax, and the remainder can be used, if so desired, to purchase
stock. The critical element here is that in a financial or economic sense,
the cash flow characteristic associated with SARs would be treated as
equal to or superior to executive stock options. Conceptually, the value
of a SAR would be greater than or equal in value to an executive stock
option with the same exercise price on the common stock. Clearly,
therefore, a contract that provides for a cash-flow stream identical to an
executive stock option, with similar constraints on trading and with the
same basis for ultimate value (the common stock), should be treated the
same as executive stock options: as a security. Ultimately, similar
treatment is required because both depend on the value of the market
price of common stock to set the value of the contract. 52
50. These securities are typically not traded or are traded only under special circumstances. A
firm might restrict the sale of stock until certain conditions are met, e.g., working for the company for
a specified term. Letter stock requires a letter to the SEC stating the conditions under which the stock
could be sold. See RICHARD A. B REALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE
355-56 (4th ed. 1991); see also RAMESH K.S. RAO, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 739-40 (South-Western
College Publ'g eds., 1995) (providing a comparison of letter and restricted stock).
51. A situation in which SARs may be the superior financial product to be holding is when the
executive must borrow so he or she can pay taxes after exercise of options, whereas no such loan
would be needed if the individual held SARs. The cost of the loan would reduce the value of the
options as compared to the SARs. See generally Laura Jereski, Poison Parachutes, FORBES, Feb. 24,
1986, at 78.
52. The financial theory invoked here is the time value of money, which provides that similar
cash flows should be evaluated in comparable fashion. Cash flows are similar if the elements of
magnitude, risk and timing are approximately equivalent. All financial resources have opportunity
costs, and cash flows are financial resources. In order to compare similar cash flow streams, all cash
flow differences must be equalized in present value by making trade-offs based on differences in risk
and timing. See JAMES C. VANHoRNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 9-20 (1 th ed. 1998).
552 [VOL. 75:535
CORPORATE ExECUTIvE DEFERRED COMPENSATION
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has demonstrated that SARs are securities just as certain-
ly as executive stock options, and, accordingly, the securities insider-
trading rules should apply to SARs as they do to any other type of
derivative security. The Riverwood opinions demonstrate the importance
and confusion of this issue: The most important issue in Riverwood, and
in this area, is that of value, not transactional nexus or marketability.
Perhaps the cornerstone of this Article is the demonstration that the
inability to trade SARs does not serve as a particularly convincing argu-
ment against categorizing them as securities. Therefore, Congress
should amend § 20(d) to add SARs and PSARs to the list of derivative
securities whose trading will trigger insider trading penalties.
Previous literature and research shows that SARs were popular
because of their special status as a benefit to the company; they even
included the ability to circumvent loan agreements or covenants restrict-
ing stock issuance, not to mention avoiding state and federal securities
laws. It is understandable, and acknowledged, that some possible
interpretations of the pertinent statutes would provide grist for the
argument that SARs are not derivative securities. However, the fact
remains that SARs are based on the economic substance of the actions
undertaken by the firm establishing the compensation plan that uses
them as an enticement to executives. SARs actually enhance a deferred
compensation deal when used in tandem with executive stock options,
without which the stock options would be much less attractive. The sine
qua non in this controversy is that SARs do have a transactional nexus to
the underlying common stock.
It is difficult to understand, within the context of the securities
statutes, how a group of insiders can make important non-public deci-
sions using inside information that will seriously affect the exchange
price of the firm's stock without "transactional nexus" 53 to the
underlying asset that would trigger insider trading liability. 54 The fact
53. Clay v. Riverwood Int'l Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1559, 1570 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
54. Professor Balsam agrees with this conceptual approach:
Synopsis: In the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Exposure Draft "Ac-
counting for Atock-Based Compensation," (June 1993) the FASB advocates valuing
employee stock options using the fair value at the grant date. This paper discusses and
illustrates the FASB approach, and presents as an alternative the method used to account
for stock appreciation rights (SARs), which it shows are economically equivalent to stock
options. Theoretically the SAR approach 1) reconciles accounting for economically
equivalent transactions, 2) produces accounting results that are objective and verifiable,
3) recognizes as expenses an amount equal to the benefit to the employee and oppor-
tunity cost to the firm, and 4) matches expenses to the period(s) in which the benefits are
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that there is no formal market trading is not the key. Clay may well have
relied upon the company's press releases in deciding to speculate that
Riverwood's stock price would increase. The corporate insiders made
certain that this did not happen by withholding disclosure of the buyout
until after they had exercised their SARs, which Congress should insure
triggers insider-trading liability.
received. Practically, when compared to the FASB proposal, compensation expense is
easier to compute and understand if the SAR method is extended to stock options. The
FASB's Exposure Draft rejects this approach. The board concludes that stock-based
compensation settled in cash (SARs) differs from stock-based compensation settled in
stock. The key difference is the former requires expenditure of an asset and is therefore
defined as a liability, whereas the latter requires issuance of stock, which is not viewed
as an asset of the company. Therefore, the FASB concludes a stock option is an equity
instrument. This paper argues that the FASB should look beyond the definitions of lia-
bilities and equities to the substance of the transaction. Since SARs and stock options are
economically equivalent, the amount of compensation recognized should be the same
whether a SAR or stock options is issued.
Balsam, supra note 37, at 52 (citation omitted).
